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THOUGHTS ON DASTAR FROM A COPYRIGHT PERSPECTIVE: 
A WELCOME STEP TOWARD RESPITE FOR THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN 
Lynn McLain t 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose you are an artist or an author of some type: for example, a 
writer, a filmmaker, a sculptor, an architect, a composer, a designer of 
computer software, or even a designer of needlepoint patterns. You want to 
build on something that is "in the public domain," that is, it is not protected 
by a copyright or a patent. 1 
Perhaps you want to incorporate a copy of "the Mona Lisa" in a 
collage or an advertisement, or write a modernized version of The Tales of 
Huckleberry Finn (much as West Side Story is a modernized version of 
Romeo and Juliet). 2 Maybe you want to take an early twentieth century 
women's suffrage poster, on which the copyright has expired, and reproduce 
it on posters for your lecture on women's rights, or as a dust cover on your 
book on the same topic. You may wish to make and sell copies of old silent 
movies, to which you have added sound tracks. Or you may wish to copy a 
centuries old mosaic tile design you have found on a church floor and make 
it into a needlepoint pattern. 
You assume that, because the underlying works are in the public 
domain, they must be freely useable by anyone. You proceed as above, and 
you are sued. If you are not able to have the case against you quickly 
dismissed, then the public domain is not as free and "public" as it ought to be 
(and as it must be, in order to achieve its intended goal). 
Over the past few decades, serious encroachments on the public 
domain have developed, particularly through the burgeoning growth in some 
American jurisdictions of causes of action under § 43(a) of the federal 
Lanham Act for "passing off' and "reverse passing off,,,3 as well as through a 
state law "right of publicity," which protects a person's name, likeness, 
persona, and voice, and even imitations of a person's voice, from commercial 
use.4 If the right of publicity applied, you could not copy "the Mona Lisa" 
without her heirs' consent (assuming her identity could be proved), despite 
the fact that the painting is not protected by copyright. 
t 
4 
Professor and Dean Joseph Curtis Fellow, University of Baltimore School of Law. The 
author wishes to express her appreciation to Steven L. Goldberg, Jr., J.D. 2004, for his 
research assistance. 
See generally James Boyle, special ed., The Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
1-483 (2003); A. Samuel Oddi, The Tragicomedy of the Public Domain in Intellectual 
Property Law, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1-64 (2003). 
See Melville B. Nimmer, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(A] at 13-25 - 13-26 (1985) 
(discussing similarities between West Side Story and Romeo and Juliet). 
See infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text. 
See infra notes 54-67 and accompanying text. 
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Even if you had obtained consent from the painting's subject, 
suppose you reproduced the painting. If the plaintiff had prevailed in the 
recent case of Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,5 so that § 
43(a) of the Lanham Act (which prohibits, inter alia, false or misleading 
designations or representations regarding the origin of goods) applied, you 
would have to credit Leonardo da Vinci, even though the work was in the 
public domain. Yet, if your copies were not as high quality as da Vinci's 
(which seems highly likely, if not inevitable), crediting him might also 
violate § 43(a).6 You would find yourself in a "lose-lose" situation. To add 
to your predicament, if § 43(a) were applicable, but you had made changes so 
that the work was neither totally da Vinci's nor totally yours, how would you 
determine whom you should credit, and how? 
Thus both a broadly defined right of publicity and a broad reading of 
§ 43(a) would create barriers to the facile use of items in the public domain. 
Such interference would thwart the underlying purpose of the United States 
Constitution's copyright and patent clause: facilitation of the growth of 
knowledge. 7 
In its recent decision in Dastar, the United States Supreme Court 
held that § 43(a) prdvides no right of attribution to the creator of an 
underlying or original work when that work is in the public domain and is 
copied by another. In that event, the manufacturer of the copies may 
designate itself as the source of the copies. The Court did a good day's work, 
stemming one of the leaks that have been draining the public domain. 
Though other questions remain umesolved and other leaks 
unstemmed, Dastar is a welcome step towards regaining the public domain, 
and towards establishing that the confines of the public domain, with regard 
to nondeceptive reproduction of public domain works, and preparation of 
derivative works based upon them, must be delimited by only the copyright 
and patent laws. 
This article will provide a background discussion of the copyright 
and patent schemes and their delineation of the public domain. It then will 
discuss the role of trademark law in that balance, and some of the case law 
regarding both § 43 of the Lanham Act and the right of publicity. Finally, it 
will hail the Supreme Court's decision in Dastar as a hopeful sign that the 
Court will reject the approach of the more expansive cases that have 
hampered the free use of works in the public domain. 
539 U.S. 23 (2003), on remand, 2003 WL 22669587, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d 1636 (C.O. Cal. 
2003) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment; no violation of California 
unfair competition law regarding reverse passing off, because California law is congruent 
with Lanham Act, as to which the Supreme Court's decision had changed the law). 
See infra note 43. 
See infra notes 1O-l3 and accompanying text. 
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II. THE COPYRIGHT AND PATENT SCHEMES AND THEIR 
RELATION TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
American copyright and patent law is intended to promote 
knowledge by rewarding authors and inventors of deserving works with 
limited monopolies for limited times, after which those works fall into the 
public domain. The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to 
"promote the Progress of Science" (in the sense of the Latin "scientia," 
meaning "knowledge") and "the useful Arts" (in the sense not of "fine arts" 
but of inventions, useful to artisans) by granting copyrights and patents to 
authors and inventors for their writings and inventions.s The Constitution 
dictates that these intellectual property rights last only "for limited Times," 
so that at the end of the copyright or patent term, the writing or invention will 
be in the public domain, free for all to use. 9 
The intellectual property rights created by Congress are seen as 
carrots, economic rewards, to encourage (1) the creation of writings and 
inventions, (2) their disclosure to the public through publication or 
registration with the Copyright Office or Patent Office, and, eventually, (3) 
their complete descent into the public domain. lo All three steps flow 
ineluctably toward the growth of knowledge, which is the primary goal of the 
copyright and patent clause. I I Subsequent authors and inventors build upon 




U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."). 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 189 (2003). See L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, 
Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders' View of the Copyright Power 
Granted to Congress in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, of the u.s. Constitution, 52 EMORY 
L.J. 910,952 (2003) (concluding that the Founders "viewed copyright as a positive law, 
not a natural law, concept" and that they incorporated the "for limited Times" provision 
in the Copyright Clause so that Congress could make the period of copyright monopoly 
"long enough to provide a profit but short enough to protect the public domain"). 
E.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) ("The 
monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily 
designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by 
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the 
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to 
allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of 
exclusive control has expired. 'The copyright law, like the patent statute, makes reward to 
the owner a secondary consideration. In Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 
(1932), Chief Justice Hughes spoke as follows respecting the copyright monopoly 
granted by Congress, "The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in 
conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors 
of authors." It is said that reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the 
public of the products of his creative genius.' United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 
U.S. 131, 158 [1948]."). 
1d. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) ("[I]t has been unusual that opinions have explained the real reason for the denial 
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Congress - or its designees, the Copyright Office and the Patent and 
Trademark Office - establishes the standards that a writing or invention must 
meet in order to be copyrightable or patentable. 12 If a work achieves these 
marks, it will be protected for the applicable term of years designated by 
Congress, at the end of which it will fall into the public domain. If a work 
falls short of these standards, a disclosed writing or invention will fall into 
the public domain,13 as long as it is not protected as another form of 
12 
13 
of patent rights, which is the basic principle (to which there are minor exceptions) that no 
patent should be granted which withdraws from the public domain technology already 
available to the public."). 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228-29 (1964) As the Sears court 
explained: 
Thus the patent system is one in which uniform federal standards 
are carefully used to promote invention while at the same time preserving 
free competition. [fn. The purpose of Congress to have national uniformity 
in patent and copyright laws can be inferred from such statutes as that 
which vests exclusive jurisdiction to hear patent and copyright cases in 
federal courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), and that section of the Copyright Act 
which expressly saves state protection of unpublished writings but does 
not include published writings, 17 U.S.c. § 2.] Obviously a State could 
not, consistently with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, extend 
the life of a patent beyond its expiration date or give a patent on an article 
which lacked the level of invention required for federal patents. To do 
either would run counter to the policy of Congress of granting patents only 
to true inventions, and then only for a limited time. Just as a State cannot 
encroach upon the federal patent laws directly, it cannot, under some other 
law, such as that forbidding unfair competition, give protection of a kind 
that clashes with the objections of the federal patent laws. 
* * * 
Doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require that 
goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other 
precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from being misled as to 
the source, just as it may protect businesses in the use of their trademarks, 
labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods so as to prevent 
others, by imitating such markings, from misleading purchasers as to the 
source of the goods. But because of the federal patent laws a State may 
not, when the article is unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the 
copying of the article itself or award damages for such copying. 
!d. at 230-33 & n.7. Sears and its companion case, Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 
Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964), are hereinafter referred to as "Sears-Compco." 
Sears-Compco, 376 U.S. at 230-31 ("Finally, and especially relevant here, when the 
patent expires the monopoly created by it expires, too, and the right to make the article -
including the right to make it in precisely the shape carried when patented - passes to the 
public."). See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429 ("As the text of the Constitution makes plain, 
it is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited 
monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public 
appropriate access to their work product. Because this task involves a difficult balance 
between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their 
writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society's competing interest in the free 
flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand, our patent and copyright 
statutes have been amended repeatedly."). 
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intellectual property (particularly, trade secretl4 or trademarkl5) that IS not 
preempted by the copyright/patent clause. 
States may protect intellectual property, 16 as long as they do not 
upset the balance that Congress has established between what is 
copyrightable or patentable and what is not. 17 This means, as held by the 
Supreme Court in Sears-Compco and expanded upon by Goldstein, that 
states cannot create the equivalent of a copyright or patent with regard to 
subject matter as to which Congress has established national standards. 18 
Otherwise, the states could affect what goes into or is held back from the 
public domain. The states cannot hold such power, or Congress would be 
unable to achieve the mission assigned it by the Constitution. 
For example, for a published idea or process to be kept out of the 
public domain, it must achieve federal patent protection. Section 1 02(b) of 
the federal Copyright Act of 1976 explains that copyright cannot extend to an 
idea or process. 19 Therefore, state law cannot provide copyright-like 








Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,474-76 (1974). 
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82,99 (1879). Trademarks are protectible under both federal 
law (the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.c. §§ 1125(a» and state law. 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578-79 (1977) (state of Ohio 
could protect "human cannonball" from having his entire, unfixed act filmed and shown 
on television without his permission). 
See Sears-Compco, 376 U.S. at 231 & n.7 and at 238-39 (1964); Goldstein v. California, 
412 U.S. 546, 569-70 (1973) ("The standards established for granting federal patent 
protection to machines thus indicated not only which articles in this particular category 
Congress wished to protect, but which configurations it wished to remain free. The 
application of state law in these cases to prevent the copying of articles which did not 
meet the requirements for federal protection disturbed the careful balance which 
Congress had drawn and thereby necessarily gave way under the Supremacy Clause of 
the Constitution. No comparable conflict between state law and federal law arises in the 
case of recordings of musical performances [first fixed before February 15, 1972, the 
effective date of the Second Recording Amendment to the Copyright Act]. In regard to 
this category of "Writings," Congress has drawn no balance; rather, it has left the area 
unattended, and no reason exists why the State should not be free to act."). See infra note 
20. 
Sears-Compco, 376 U.S. at 231 and at 237 (1964); Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 569-70 (1973). 
See 17 U.S.c. § 301(a) (2002) ("On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights 
that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as 
specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 
and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, 
are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right 
or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State."). 
17 U.S.c. § 102(b) (2002) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated or embodied in such work."). 
United States ex reI. Berge v. Bd. ofTrs. ofUniv. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1463 (4th CiT. 
1997) ("the shadow actually cast by the [Copyright] Act's preemption is notably broader 
than the wing of its protection"); Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 
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processes that had not achieved federal patent protection could be removed 
from the public domain. 
Section I 02( a) of the Copyright Act provides for the copyrightability 
ofprotectible expression in original works (including literary works) that are 
fixed in a tangible medium of expression.21 Therefore, state law cannot 
provide copyright-like protection for fixed (written down, taped, or recorded) 
literary works.22 A literary work that is fixed may achieve copyright 
protection only by complying with the federal Copyright Act, and only for 
the time prescribed by that Act. Failure to achieve protection under the Act-
for example, by lack of originality - will result in the work's falling into the 
public domain once it is made public. 
Once even a copyright-protected original fixed work is published by 
the author, the ideas and processes contained and described in it fall into the 
public domain (unless protected by patent).23 Protection of those facets of a 
published writing may be obtained only via a patent, as to which Congress 
has established high standards.24 
If the inventor chooses to keep the process or idea secret, however, it 
may be protected as a trade secret, under state law. The United States 
Supreme Court has held that state trade secret protection is not the equivalent 
of a patent and, therefore, is not preempted by either the copyright and patent 
clause or the supremacy doctrine.25 
Section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976 codified the Supreme 
Court's holdings, including those in Sears-Compeo and Goldstein, with 
regard to state law protection of types of works falling within the subject 






1061-62 (C.D. CaL 2000) (§ 102(b)'s provision that copyright does not extend to ideas 
creates a balance, so that ideas flow into public domain; implied-in-fact contract claim for 
ideas in copyrighted screenplay was preempted). 
17 V.S.c. § 102(a)(I) (2002) ("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this 
title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now 
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of 
authorship include the following categories: (1) literary works .... "). 
E.g., Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., 1 F.3d 225, 232-33 (4th Cir. 1993) (Virginia 
Computer Crimes Act, which would have punished the reproduction of appellant's 
ORBIS computer software, is preempted by the Copyright Act of 1976). 
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1879) ("To give to the author of the book an 
exclusive property in the art described therein, when no examination of its novelty has 
ever been officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the 
province of letters-patent, not of copyright. The claim to an invention or discovery of an 
art or manufacture must be subjected to the examination of the Patent Office before an 
exclusive right therein can be obtained; and it can only be secured by a patent from the 
government. * * * By publishing the book, without getting a patent for the art, the latter is 
given to the public."). 
/d. 
Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 491-92. Accord, e.g., Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 
996 F.2d 655, 667 (4th Cir. 1993). 
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On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable 
rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights 
within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 
106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of 
copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether 
created before or after that date and whether published or 
unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. 
Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or 
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or 
statutes of any State?6 
A state may not provide protection equivalent to copyright for fixed works. 
A Copyright Office regulation provides that "short phrases" are "not 
subject to copyright.,,27 We do not want to remove such basic building blocks 
from the public domain.28 They must be fully available to use in new 
writings. Yet short phrases and logos that may not be copyrightable may 
enjoy trademark protection under either state or federal law or both, when 
trademark law is not equivalent to copyright law. Trademark protection has 
been held to be generally different in kind from copyright and patent 
protection.29 Trademark law does not necessarily prevent the reproduction of 
a work; it generally merely protects consumers from being misled as to the 
source of the copy. 
III. THE ROLE OF TRADEMARK LAW 
Like copyright and unlike patent, trademark protection does not 
prevent others from copying an underlying idea or process. But unlike 
copyright, trademark does not generally prevent others from copying the 
particular words or symbols that constitute a trade name, slogan, or logo. 





17 U.S.c. § 301(a) (2002). See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding, over thoughtful dissent by Judge Dyk, that Copyright Act does 
not preempt shrink-wrap license that prohibits reverse engineering of computer 
software)., cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 2588, 156 L.Ed.2d 606 (U.S. 2003). Contra Vault 
Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. La. 1987) (Copyright Act 
preempted provisions of Louisiana shrink-wrap licensing law that forbade all copying, 
even for archival and essential uses, as well as reverse engineering to prepare derivative 
works). 
37 C.F.R. § 202.I(a) (2002). 
See, e.g., John Muller & Co. v. New York Arrows Soccer Team, Inc., 802 F.2d 989 (8th 
Cir. 1986) (upholding Copyright Office's refusal to register a sports team's logo). 
See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 6: 1 (2002). 
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create confusion among consumers as to the source of a good or service. 30 
Trademark protection will last as long as the mark is recognized by the 
consuming public as signifying a particular source of the good or service.3l It 
thus can last perpetually.32 
For example, trademark law provides that a cola drink sold by 
Howard Johnson's cannot be called Coca-Cola when it was not made by the 
Coca-Cola Company.33 But it can be called HoJo's Cola, as the word "cola" 
has become generic, describing a brown, carbonated soft drink?4 A clock not 
manufactured by Rolex could not be labeled "Rolex" without violating the 
trademark on Rolex watches, as consumers are likely to be misled into 
thinking that the clock will have been manufactured by the manufacturer of 
the watch. But a cheap brand of tire could probably be called "Roll-X" 
without impinging on the watch manufacturer's trademark or that of the 
manufacturer of the antacid tablet, Rolaids. Consumers are unlikely to think 
that the tires emanate from the same source as either the watches or the pills. 
And a poet could wax poetic about Rolexes, Roll-X's, and Rolaids, without 
misleading the public as to the origin or source of the poem. 
As "good fences make good neighbors,,,35 clear lines of demarcation 
between copyright, patent, trade secret, and trademark protection ensure that 
the realms of the first two - and the concomitant expanse of the public 
domain when works fail to achieve copyright or patent protection, or when 
that protection expires - are not encroached upon. A copyright cannot protect 
an idea or process, but can protect its literary explanation.36 A patent can 
protect the useful aspects of an invention, but not its literary description.37 
The title of a novel is not protected by the novel's copyright, but the title may 










See id. at § 6:14. But see Boston Prof'1 Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 
Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1971) (copying of ice hockey teams' logos on patches to put 
on clothing violated trademark law) (an approach rejected in Order of Job's Daughters v. 
Lindeburg & Co, 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1980». 
See, e.g., Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining that 
trademark rights may continue as long as the mark is used to distinguish and identify). 
See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
("[T]rademark protection is potentially perpetual in duration."). 
See Coca-Cola Co. v. Howard Johnson Co., 386 F. Supp. 330, 334-38 (1974). See also 
Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1252 (9th Cir. 1982) (enjoining 
Overland from substituting in response to orders for "Coca-Cola" or "Coke" any 
beverage other than that sold by the Coca-Cola Company unless Overland first gives 
customer notice of the substitution and obtains the customer's approval). 
Horizon Mills Corp. v. QVC, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 208, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
Richard Poirier & Mark Richardson, Mending Wall, in ROBERT FROST: COLLECTED 
POEMS, PROSE, & PLAYS 39 (Library of America 1995). 
Baker, 101 U.S. at 102-04 (1879). 
See id. at 102-03. 
See, e.g., Warner Bros. Pictures v. Majestic Pictures Corp., 70 F.2d 310,312-13 (2d Cir. 
1934) (holding that use oftenn "Gold Diggers" in movie was prohibited, absent adequate 
disclaimer of connection with original play entitled "The Gold Diggers"); Simon & 
Schuster, Inc. v. Dove Audio, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 279, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (concluding 
that "The Children's Audio-book of Virtues" violated § 43(a), in light of previous 
unrelated book, "The Book of Virtues"). 
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will likely infringe Margaret Mitchell's heirs' (or her publisher's) trademark 
if it is not made clear that the book is entirely different,39 e.g., a tale of losses 
from the high tech stock market decline. 
Things become worrisome only where a body of law that is not 
copyright affects either the copyright owner's right to exploit the copyrighted 
work or the public's right to use a copyrightable-type of work that is in the 
public domain. For the reasons first set forth in the Supreme Court's 
decisions in Sears-Compco,40 the calibration of this balance must be by 
Congress alone, and in the copyright arena alone. 
IV. PASSING OFF, REVERSE PASSING OFF, AND SECTION 43(A) 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act protects even unregistered 
trademarks.41 Originally enacted in 1946,42 section 43(a) now reads, as 
amended in 1988: 
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any 
goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in 
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false 
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading 
representation of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, 
or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association 
of such person with another person, or as to the origin, 
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or 
commercial activities by another person, or 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, 
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or 
geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, 
services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil 
action by any person who believes that he or she is or is 
likely to be damaged by such act.43 
Section 43(a) is a creature of Congress. It thus might not be seen to be 
capable of conflicting with Congress's power under the copyright clause. 
But § 43(a) was enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, not the 
copyright clause. Should it disturb the copyright/public domain balance 






See supra note 38. 
See supra note 12. 
See e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). 
Lanham Act, ch. 540,60 Stat. 441 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) 
(1988)). 
15 U.S.c. § 1125(a)(I)(West 1998 & Supp. 2003). 
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scheme than the state laws proscribed by Sears-CompeD and § 301 of the 
Copyright Act. It is from this principle that some of the lower courts had 
strayed, pre-Dastar. These courts had been quick to find "passing off' and 
"reverse passing off' actionable under § 43(a), where in this author's opinion 
the facts of the cases were adequately, and should have been found to be 
exclusively, controlled by federal copyright law. 
A. "Passing Off" and "Reverse Passing Off" 
"Passing off' occurs where the defendant deceives consumers into 
believing that its goods are those of the plaintiff's. If, for example, Rite~Aid 
sold batteries manufactured by it but labeled them as Duracell batteries, Rite-
Aid would be guilty of passing off. Here consumers would be misled into 
buying something they thought came from the manufacturer of Duracell. 
Assuming the batteries were inferior to or different from what the consumers 
expected, the consumers would be harmed.44 Duracell would also be harmed 
due to the resulting loss of goodwill. 
"Reverse passing off' is the opposite. Here the defendant markets the 
plaintiff's goods as the defendant's. This would occur if Rite-Aid relabeled 
authentic Duracell batteries as "Rite-Aid" batteries. Here, again, the 
consumers would be duped, and Duracell would lose goodwill to Rite-Aid, 
who would "get credit" for the better batteries. 
These concepts properly may be applied to various non-
copyrightable aspects of copyrightable types of works, such as book, song, 
and movie titles. A theater-goer who purchases tickets to "The Producers" 
will be harmed if the play turns out not to be the Mel Brooks movie spin-off 
the theater-goer expects, but an entirely different work, with no connection to 
Mel Brooks. The potential harm of the type addressed by trademark law may 
be prevented, however, by clearly labeling the good as coming from the 
defendant, rather than the plaintiff. Thus, "The Producers: A Play about the 
Steel Industry" would likely not infringe Mel Brooks's trademark. Similarly, 
"Gone With the Wind," labeled "a story of loss in the high tech stock 
market," by "A.N. Author," would not be found to be passing itself off as 
Margaret Mitchell's book. 
But some lower courts have read § 43(a) so broadly as to provide a 
duplicate remedy for copyright infringement. This is unnecessary, as 
copyright is adequate to the task. It is also dangerous, in that trademark 
protection can be perpetual, and will apply even when copyright does not. 
44 See Don J. DeBenedictis, Photo Realism: Judge Requires Truth in Labeling for Ansel 
Adams Copies, 75 A.B.A. J. 37 (Oct. 1989) (discussing Adams v. Day Dream Publishing, 
Inc., C-89-0873-WDK (C.D. Cal. 1989) (heirs of Ansel Adams had cause of action for 
"passing off' against publisher of calendars, books, and posters of Ansel Adams' prints 
that were in the public domain, because reproductions were inferior to original prints; fair 
labelling was ordered». 
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B. "Paddington Bear" Goes to Court 
In a series of English children's books, Paddington Bear travels by 
train to Paddington Station, London, and embarks on a number of humorous 
adventures. The illustrated character was soon reproduced in licensed stuffed 
toys and other media. Amidst Paddington Bear's commercial success, a 
manufacturer produced nightshirts that had a close look-alike of Paddington 
Bear reproduced on the fabric. The nightshirts contained the notice "© Fred 
Original.,,45 
In Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the nightshirt infringed the 
copyright on a derivative work, a version of Paddington Bear manufactured 
in the United States.46 This decision-although pushing the envelope of how 
minimal changes could be in order to deserve a derivative copyright47-was 
a straightforward copyright infringement case. 
But the Second Circuit went further. It also held that the legend "© 
Fred Original" was a "false designation of origin" and thus a violation of the 
Lanham Act.48 Under this holding, any time a manufacturer - even if 
innocently believing it holds copyright - uses a copyright notice that 
incorrectly claims copyright, the manufacturer will violate the Lanham Act.49 
That overlap - in effect making the copyright infringement by the 
nightshirt manufacturer also a Lanham Act infringement - is obviously 
unnecessary in order to further the policy underlying copyright. 50 One may 
argue that the overlap does no harm to the copyright/public domain balance 
because the Lanham Act cause of action is merely duplicative of the 
copyright claim. Yet this ignores the wisdom of Sears-Compeo, which held 







Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergannent Co., 697 F.2d 27,31 (2d Cir. 1986). 
Id. at 37. 
Compare Eden Toys with Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983). See 
generally Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of 
"Authorship", 1991 DUKEL.J. 455 (1991). 
Eden Toys, 697 F.2d at 37. 
Accord Waldman Publ'g Corp. v. Landol1, Inc., 43 F.3d 775 (2d Cir. 1994) (remanding 
on reverse passing off claim as to literary work); Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Dragon 
Pac. Int'!, 40 F.3d 1007, 10 II (9th Cir. 1994) (affinning award of both statutory damages 
for copyright infringement and actual damages for trademark infringement); EFS Mktg., 
Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 836 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that the use of 
copyright notice by works that do not qualify as derivative works because of only slight 
variations from public domain works violated the Lanham Act, even though the parties 
held copyright registrations); Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, 124 F. Supp. 2d 836 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (denying motions to dismiss "reverse passing oft" counter claims under the 
Lanham Act and state unfair competition law for failure to attribute authorship of 
elements of "Harry Potter" to defendant rather than to plaintiff J.K. Rowling, and holding 
that they were not duplicative of copyright claim). 
See Ralph S. Brown, Copyright and Its Upstart Cousins: Privacy. Publicity. Unfair 
Competition, 33 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 301 (1986) (criticizing this overlap). 
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of action for copyright or patent, period. Else Congress's exclusive power 
under the copyright/patent clause can be circumvented and diminished. That 
same dimunition can result if the courts construe Congress's own action 
under the Commerce Clause, in such a way as to upset the balance Congress 
has deliberately created under the copyright/patent clause between what is 
protectible and what is in the public domain. Indeed, recognizing a 
duplicative cause of action under the Lanham Act could cause much 
mischief, as Lanham Act protection is potentially perpetual and could 
conflict with the "limited Times" provision of the copyright clause. 5 1 
Perhaps this point may be more easily seen in a different context, 
where the underlying work was in the public domain. 
C. What Harm? 
Suppose that Paddington Bear had been in the public domain: that 
Fred took Paddington and made some changes, to come up with a somewhat 
different image; and that Fred again published with the notice "© Fred 
Original." There now is no copyright infringement. 
But if the Copyright Office finds insufficient originality for the new 
version to deserve copyright as a derivative work, does the now held-to-be-
incorrect legend mean that Fred has violated the Lanham Act? Such a 
holding would force copyright proprietors, or those who believe themselves 
to have created something copyrightable including those who work with 
public domain items and make what they believe to be derivative works -
(and who wish to enjoy the added protection that copyright notice provides, 
e.g., under the Uniform Copyright Convention), to proceed through 
registration with the Copyright Office before publishing with notice. Absent 
approval of the Copyright Office, the creator of the new version risks a 
finding that she has violated the Lanham Act. The resulting de facto 
requirement for registration, in order to proceed without risk of liability 
under the Lanham Act, is plainly at odds with the Copyright Act's provision 
that registration is permissive, not mandatory.52 Worse, even a certificate of 
registration has been held to be insufficient to preclude a violation of the 
Lanham Act under this theory. 53 
There is no need for the Lanham Act to stick its nose under the tent. 
The copyright law provides adequately for protection against infringers and 




See supra note 32. 
See 17 U.S.c. §§ 408(a) & 411 (registration is permissive at least until one wishes to file 
suit for infringement). 
EFS Mktg., Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 836 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (use of 
copyright notice by works that do not qualify as derivative works because of only slight 
variations from public domain works violated the Lanham Act, even though the parties 
held copyright registrations); Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Dragon Pacific Int'l, 40 F.3d 
1007 (9th Cir. 1994) (affrrming award of both statutory damages for copyright 
infringement and actual damages for trademark infringement). 
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If the goal of having the public domain is to be met - and growing 
the public domain is the ultimate goal of the copyright and patent clause -
the line of demarcation between what is and what is not in the public domain 
must be kept clear. Cases such as Eden Toys create an unnecessary overlap 
between copyright law and the Lanham Act that prevents federal copyright 
law from alone dictating whaUs protected and what is in the public domain. 
The same criticism must be made of various state and federal lower courts' 
expansive decisions regarding the "right of publicity:" they muddy the water 
as to what is in the public domain. 
V. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY'S INTERFERENCE WITH THE 
BALANCE BETWEEN COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN 
The fast-growing "right of publicity," an assignable right to the 
commercial use of one's name or likeness,54 has thrown another monkey 
wrench at the balance established by the Copyright Act, a balance protected 
by Sears-Compeo and § 301(a) of the Copyright Act. The "right of publicity" 
cause of action can upset this balance in two ways: (I) by interfering with a 
copyright owner's right to license uses of its copyrighted work and (2) by 
interfering with others' rights to use or copy what copyright law has 
relegated to the public domain.55 
The two most notorious cases illustrating the reach of this monkey 
wrench both involve extreme readings of what is protected as an individual 
person's likeness, for which that person has the right to decline or authorize 
its commercial use. The "Bette Midler case,,56 exemplifies the first type of 
interference with the federal copyright scheme, and the "Vanna White 
case,,,57 the second. 
A. Copyright Owner's Hands are Bound 
In the Bette Midler case, the United States Court of Appeals for the 





Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. 
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). 
Preventing artists from portraying public figures without their permission would infringe 
on the goals of both the copyright clause and the First Amendment. See ETW Corp. v. 
Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that a painting portraying Tiger 
Woods' winning of the 1997 Masters violates neither his right of pUblicity nor the 
Lanham Act). 
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1988), after remand, 944 F.2d 
909 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 951 (1992). Accord Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 
978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1080 (1993). 
White v. Samsung E1ecs. America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), rehearing en 
bane denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter White II], cert. denied, 508 U.S. 
951 (1993). 
84 Baltimore Intellectual Property Law Journal [Vol. 11 
prevent the copyright owner of a song from freely licensing its use. There the 
copyright owners of the musical composition "Do You Want to Dance?" had 
licensed its use in a Ford automobile commercial. 
Bette Midler had earlier made a popular sound recording of the song. 
She owned the copyright in neither the song nor the sound recording. Ford 
Motor Company wanted to use Bette Midler, singing that song, in a 
television commercial. 
Ford bought a license from the copyright holder of the song. Ford 
asked Midler to sing for its commercial, but she declined. Ford then hired 
another singer and instructed her to make her performance sound like 
Midler's version. This was all perfectly legitimate and within the balance 
carefully established by Congress in the Copyright Act. 
Under the Copyright Act, the copyright owner in a musical sound 
recording (who in any event is most often a record company, not the 
performer) has protection against only "record pirates" who do not hold their 
own recording session but simply press new copies of the first person's 
recording. A subsequent maker of a new sound recording of a song must 
either have permission (as is required for use in a television commercial) or 
enjoy a § 115 compulsory license as to the underlying song, if it is protected 
by copyright. 58 In that event, § 114 provides that the new recording session 
may even "imitate or simulate those [sounds] in the copyrighted sound 
recording," as long as it does not "directly or indirectly recapture the actual 
sounds fixed in the recording.,,59 Ford had done just what Congress had 
permitted in the context of new recordings under § 115. Certainly what 
Congress has approved without the need for the copyright owner's 
permission would not be something Congress intended to forbid the 
copyright owner from approving itself. 
But the Ninth Circuit held that California state law would hold that 
Midler's distinctive voice was part of her likeness and, therefore, Ford's 
commercial infringed upon Midler's right of publicity. Even labeling the ads 
"celebrity sound-alike" would not cure the problem. Ford simply could not 
air the ads without Midler's permission. Therefore, the copyright proprietor 
was precluded from exploiting its copyrighted work as it chose, within the 
balance created by Congress. 
This preclusion was accomplished under state law, giving a right to 
the performer of the song, whose contribution Congress has excluded from 
entitlement to copyright protection, except against mere "record pirates." 
Midler thus struck a stunning blow to the copyright/public domain balance. 
B. Effect on What is in the Public Domain 
Under the facts of Midler, the copyright proprietor could not freely 
license the song, as it chose. Logically, under Midler, the states also can 
58 
59 
17 V.S.c. § 1 15(a) (2002). 
[d. at § 114(b). 
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extend such a right of publicity to prevent voice imitation in public domain 
songs under similar circumstances. 
The same harmful effect on the public domain flows from another 
Ninth Circuit decision, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.6o Here 
the defendant was the author of a copyrightable type of work, a print 
advertisement (hence an author to be encouraged under the copyright 
clause).61 The ad depicted a robot wearing an evening gown and turning 
letters on a set reminiscent of "The Wheel of Fortune" game show set. The 
thrust of the ad was that, at a time far in the future, Samsung's VCR would 
still be "state of the art." The defendant had copied the idea of a Vanna 
White-type functionary on a Wheel of Fortune-type set. 
Vanna White sued under California law, alleging that the ad violated 
her right of publicity by exploiting her "likeness.,,62 The majority of a 
divided panel found for White. Judge Alarcon,63 however, wrote an inspired 
and delightful dissenting opinion, as did Judge Kozinski,64 who wished to 
rehear the case en banco They had the better of the argument. The majority's 
decision foiled a creative author - the author of the humorous ad - who 
under copyright law copied only a noncopyrightable idea. Surely this result is 
not consonant with the purpose of the copyright clause. 
The defendants in Midler and White both had the green light under 
copyright law - whether because of permission from the copyright proprietor 
or because of the fact that what was copied was unprotectible and in the 
public domain under copyright law. But that was insufficient to allow these 
subsequent users or authors to proceed safely. 
These causes of action under § 43(a)65 and the right of publicity have 
grown like kudzu, choking the public domain. Although some jurisdictions 
have declined to follow the cases discussed above, either as to § 43(a)66 or as 
to the right of publicity,67 these cases continue to reach their tendrils across 
the country, since many defendants publish their works in every state, and 









See supra note 57. 
See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239,251-52 (1903). 
White, 971 F.2d at 1397. 
White II, 971 F.2d at 1402-08 (Alarcon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
White, 989 F.2d at 1512-21 (Kozinski, J., dissenting,joined by O'Scannlain and 
Kleinfeld, JJ.). 
Section 43(a) also has been used to provide a remedy for a defendant's commercial use of 
the plaintiffs likeness. Prudhomme v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 800 F. Supp. 390, 395 
(E.D. La. 1992) (holding that unauthorized use of a celebrity look-alike in an 
advertisement violated § 43(a) of the Lanham Act). 
Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2001); Boothroyd Dewhurst, Inc. V. Poli, 
783 F. Supp. 670 (D. Mass. 1991) (First Circuit recognizes no cause of action for reverse 
palming off under § 43(a». See also Chicago Style Prods., Inc. v. Chicago Sun Times, 
Inc., 728 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. App.2000) (state law preempted). 
Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 341 N.E.2d 817 (N.Y. 1975). See Toney v. L'Oreal USA, 
Inc., 64 u.S.P.Q.2d 1857 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (Illinois state law preempted by copyright law). 
86 Baltimore Intellectual Property Law Journal [Vol. 11 
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Dastar, however, provides 
hope that the kudzu will be eradicated. 
VI. DASTAR TO THE RESCUE 
The Court's opinion in Dastar has two salient virtues. First, the 
Court recognizes the value of the public domain (particularly reassuring, 
since this is a value that the Court had only recently snubbed in Eldred v. 
Ashcrofl·68 upholding the constitutionality of Congress's extension of the 
American copyright term to life plus 70 years, even ex post facto for those 
works that had been created with the expectation of shorter copyright 
terms).69 Second, it soundly reaffirms the Sears-Compco doctrine that the 
federal copyright law describes the public domain, where works falling 
within the subject matter of copyright are at issue. 
A. The Concept of the Public Domain 
Once a work within the scope of copyright is in the public domain 
under copyright law, it ought to be in the public domain under all legal 
theories, to the extent that it can be freely copied, altered, performed, 
displayed, and distributed. Thus, when Mark Twain's "Tom Sawyer" went 
into the public domain, any publisher could print copies and sell it, without 
owing Twain any money and without his enjoying any veto power. As long 
as the publisher does not change the text, the publisher ought to be able to 
credit Mark Twain as the author, so that the consuming public knows what it 
is purchasing. The author ought to have no right to stop this commercial use 
of his name, as the book is in the public domain, and it remains apparent that 
Twain is its author. The publisher also ought to be free to delete Twain's 
name, as the publisher chooses. Naming someone else as the author, 
however, ought not be permitted, by virtue of the Lanham Act, as that would 
mislead consumers.70 
The book "Tom Sawyer, by Mark Twain" must be free to be 
reproduced as such. If states' right of publicity laws, like that applied in the 
Bette Midler and Vanna White cases, were so broad as to prevent the 
publisher's selling its copies of the properly attributed book, the state laws 




537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the majority of the Court upheld this extension despite 
the "for limited times" provision in the Constitution's copyright clause -- and pennitted 
Congress to justify this extension as desirable harmonization with the terms recently 
extended by European countries, see 537 U.S. at 204-10 & nn.IO-17. No mention was 
made of the fact that those countries have no written constitutions limiting their 
legislatures' power in this area. Justices Stevens and Breyer each dissented. See Matt 
Jackson, Harmony or Discord? The Pressure Toward Conformity in International 
Copyright, 43 IDEA 607, 627-34 (2003), for a discussion on the push for copyright law 
harmonization around the world. 
See supra note 38. 
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laws' interference with the public's right of free distribution of what is in the 
public domain would upset the balance that Congress has carefully 
established under the copyright regime. 
The work's distribution must be governed by federal copyright law 
and no other (excepting only any restrictions on the copyright law that may 
be imposed by the First Amendmene'). Even Congress ought not be 
permitted to upset the copyright/public domain balance via its power from 
any source (including the much more general commerce clause, which is its 
source of power for the Lanham Act72) other than the copyright clause of the 
Constitution.73 
Yet that public domain had been intruded upon by a line of federal 
cases construing § 43(a) of the Lanham Act that was reversed in Dastar. 74 
B. No "Right of Attribution" of Authorship under § 43(a) 
Under that line of cases, the subsequent user of a public domain 
work (such as "Tom Sawyer") was "damned if he did" attribute the work to 
the original author (Mark Twain) and "damned if he didn't." If he gave 
attribution, but the copies he sold were not actually produced by that author, 
he was guilty of "passing Off.,,75 If he failed to give attribution, he was guilty 
of "reverse passing off." 76 
In Dastar, the defendant Dastar had reproduced, with some 
revisions, a work within the subject matter of copyright, that was in the 
public domain. The work in question was a television documentary series, a 
derivative work (adapted from a book by another author) which series had 
enjoyed copyright protection but had fallen into the public domain when its 
proprietor failed to renew the copyright. 77 (Whether the copyright on the 
original work, the book underlying the television series, was infringed by the 
defendant's actions was not addressed by the Supreme Court; the court of 
appeals had remanded on that count. 78) The defendant had made some editing 









Dastar manufactured and sold the [World War II] 
Campaigns video set as its own product. The 
See generally William W. Van Alstyne, Reconciling What the First Amendment Forbids 
with What the Copyright Clause Permits: A Summary Explanation and Review, 66 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (2003). 
U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 8, cl. 8. 
The reach of the more specific provision should govern to establish the parameters of 
Congress's power as to copyright-like or patent-like protection for categories of works 
over which Congress has power under the copyright/patent clause. 
Dastar, 123 S. Ct. at 2049. 
[d. 
Id. 
Id. at 2044. 
Id. at 2045 & n.2. 
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advertising states: "Produced and Distributed by: 
Entertainment Distributing" (which is owned by 
Dastar), and makes no reference to the [plaintiffs] 
Crusade television series. Similarly, the screen 
credits state "DAST AR CORP presents" and "an 
ENTERTAINMENT DISTRIBUTING Production," 
and list as executive producer, producer, and 
associate producer, employees of Dastar.79 
[VoI.ll 
The plaintiff argued that Dastar's failure to credit the plaintiff as the 
source of the series violated § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.80 Eight members of 
the Court (Justice Breyer did not participate) held, in an unanimous opinion 
authored by Justice Scalia, that § 43(a) provides no right of attribution to the 
creator of a work that is in the public domain and copied by another. 81 The 
Court emphasized that the purpose of the Lanham Act differs from that of the 
copyright law,82 and that a copyright proprietor's protection is provided 
solely by the copyright law.83 Here, Dastar was the source, or "origin," of the 
goods - the tangible videotapes.84 Hence, it committed no violation of § 
43(a).85 The fact that the goods were communicative made no difference in 









Id. at 2044. 
Id. at 2044-45. 
Id. at 2050. 
Id. at 2048. 
Id. 
Id. at 2050. See Bretford Mfg. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Ill. 
Oct. 6, 2003) (No. 98-C0287) (no cause of action for reverse passing off when goods 
were not "sold in the marketplace"). 
Dastar, 123 S. Ct.. at 2050. 
Id. at 2047-50. The Court explains: 
It could be argued, perhaps, that the reality of purchaser concern is 
different for what might be called a communicative product - one that is valued 
not primarily for its physical qualities, such as a hammer, but for the 
intellectual content that it conveys, such as a book or, as here, a video. The 
purchaser of a novel is interested not merely, if at all, in the identity of the 
producer of the physical tome (the publisher), but also, and indeed primarily, in 
the identity of the creator of the story it conveys (the author). And the author, 
of course, has at least as much interest in avoiding passing-off (or reverse 
passing-off) of his creation as does the publisher. For such a communicative 
product (the argument goes) "origin of goods" in § 43(a) must be deemed to 
include not merely the producer of the physical item (the publishing house 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, or the video producer Dastar) but also the creator of 
the content that the physical item conveys (the author Tom Wolfe, or -
assertedly - respondents). 
The problem with this argument according special treatment to 
communicative products is that it causes the Lanham Act to conflict with the 
law of copyright, which addresses that subject specifically. The right to copy, 
and to copy without attribution, once a copyright has expired, like "the right to 
make [an article whose patent has expired]-including the right to make it in 
precisely the shape it carried when patented-passes to the public." Sears. 
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230, 84 S.Ct. 784, 11 L.Ed. 2d 661, 
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plaintiff s work had been, for example, a toaster that was not protected by 
patent and that had no trademark protection in its physical design. There, 
too, had Dastar manufactured identical toasters, labeling them as coming 
from Dastar would have been proper. 
The Court left open the possibility that, if the defendant had made a 
false statement, such as labelling the videotapes "contents created by 
Dastar," the defendant would have violated § 43(a) by making a false 
representation as to the good's "nature, characteristics, [or] qualities.,,87 That 
[1964 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 425] (1964); see also Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit 
Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121-122,59 S.Ct. 109,83 L.Ed. 73, [1939 Dec. Comm'r 
Pat. 850] (1938). "In general, unless an intellectual property right such as a 
patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying." TrajFix 
Devices. Inc. v. Marketing Displays. Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29, 121 S.Ct. 1255, 149 
L.Ed. 2d 164, (2001). The rights of a patentee or copyright holder are part of a 
"carefully crafted bargain," Bonito Boats. Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats. Inc., 489 
U.S. 141, 150-151, 109 S.Ct. 971,103 L.Ed. 2d 118 (1989), under which, once 
the patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention 
or work at will and without attribution. Thus, in construing the Lanham Act, we 
have been "careful to caution against misuse or over-extension" of trademark 
and related protections into areas traditionally occupied by patent or copyright. 
TrajFix, 532 U.S., at 29, 121 S.Ct. 1255. "The Lanham Act," we have said, 
"does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating a 
particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of 
exclusivity." Id., at 34, 121 S.Ct. at 1255. Federal trademark law "has no 
necessary relation to invention or discovery," In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 
U.S. 82, 94, 25 L.Ed. 550, [1879 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 619 (1879)], but rather, by 
preventing competitors from copying "a source-identifying mark," "reduces the 
customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions," and "helps 
assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the 
financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product," 
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-164, 115 S.Ct. 1300, 
131 L.Ed. 2d 248 (1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Assuming for the sake of argument that Dastar's representation of itself as the 
"Producer" of its videos amounted to a representation that it originated the 
creative work conveyed by the videos, allowing a cause of action under § 43(a) 
for that representation would create a species of mutant copyright law that 
limits the public's "federal right to 'copy and to use,'" expired copyrights, 
Bonito Boats, supra, at 165, 109 S.Ct. 971. 
When Congress has wished to create such an addition to the law of 
copyright, it has done so with much more specificity than the Lanham Act's 
ambiguous use of "origin." * * * 
* * * 
87 
* * * To hold otherwise would be akin to finding that § 43(a) created a species 
of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not do. See Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,208,123 S.Ct. 769, 154 L.Ed. 2d 683 (2003). 
Id. at 2047-48, 2050. 
Id. at 2050 ("If ... the producer of a video that substantially copied the Crusade series 
were, in advertising or promotion, to give purchasers the impression that the video was 
quite different from that series, then one or more of the respondents might have a cause 
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is, in this author's opinion, as it should be. Had Dastar so labeled the tapes, 
its representation would have been knowingly false. Declining to engage in 
knowing falsity is not a burden on those who wish to properly use public 
domain works. 
But the Court's analysis happily suggests that labeling that is truthful 
in the eyes of the producer of the good, acting reasonably, would not violate 
§ 43(a). This, coupled with the court's emphasis that copyright law is the 
only body of law that may provide a cause of action for copyright 
infringement, supports the welcome inference that the Court would not 
readily endorse the apparent Eden Toys holding that an incorrect copyright 
notice, without more, is a violation of § 43(a) in addition to any underlying 
copyright violation. 
C. An Encouraging Step 
The Court's recognition in Dastar of the importance of the public 
domain - and the Court's reaffirmation that copyright law alone governs the 
rights in categories of works falling within the subject matter of copyright -
are hopeful indications for defenders of the public domain. 
Perhaps the Court will grant certiorari in other cases that will give it 
the opportunity to hold, for example, that a right of pUblicity as applied in 
Mid/er and White is preempted by copyright law.88 If given the opportunity, 
the Court also ought hold that "shrink-wrap" licenses - which are contracts 
of adhesion rather than ones negotiated between the parties - and causes of 
action for misappropriation89 and quasi contract90 which also apply against 
88 
89 
of action-not for reverse passing off under the "confusion ... as to the origin" provision 
of § 43 (a)(l )(A), but for misrepresentation under the "misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics [or] qualities" provision of § 43(a)(l)(B). For merely saying it is the 
producer of the video, however, no Lanham Act liability attaches to Dastar."). See, e.g., 
Dodd v. Fort Smith Special School Dist., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1395 (W.O. Ark. 1987) 
(recognizing a § 43(a) cause of action for false attribution to defendant of authorship of 
plaintiffs book). But see Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F.Supp.2d 1177 
(C.D.Cal 2003) (applying Dastar to preclude cause of action for reverse passing off 
against collaborators who failed to make attribution to plaintiff in film credits, but gave 
attribution only to themselves; the court treated case as one regarding only the "origin of 
goods"); Carroll V. Kahn, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d 1357 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2003)(No. 03-
0656)(semble ). 
See Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that baseball players' right of publicity was not infringed by television 
broadcasts of baseball games) (author's note: unfortunately, the case was not decided on 
preemption grounds, but on the ground that the players' contributions were works made 
for hire and thus the copyright to them was owned by the teams; the opinion overlooked 
the fact that the players made no copyrightable contributions to the film). 
See e.g., Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 100 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(finding misappropriation claims as to computer software preempted by federal copyright 
law). Compare e.g., Schuchart & Associates v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F.Supp. 928 (W.O. 
Tex. 1982) (preemption of misappropriation claim, but not of unjust enrichment claim for 
value of services rendered, regarding defendant's copying and use of plaintiffs 
copyrighted mechanical and electrical drawings) with Yost v. Early, 87 Md. App. 364, 
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the world rather than between negotiating parties that override the balance 
established by Congress as to fair use are also preempted. 9 I Such decisions 
would help to enhance the public domain, at no cost to the scheme of 
copyright protection designed by Congress. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In 1964, Sears-Compeo clearly voiced the importance of the federal 
patent and copyright law's demarcation establishing the line between what is 
and what is not in the public domain. Expansive subsequent readings by 
some lower courts regarding § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, some states' 
recognition of an individual's right of publicity and state contract law 
enforcing restrictive shrink-wrap licenses blurred those lines. 
In its 2003 decision in Dastar, the Supreme Court has resoundingly 
reasserted the Sears-Compeo rationale, but in the context of the Lanham Act. 
Dastar is an important step in staunching the flow of works out of the public 
domain, from which they had been carried not by copyright law, but by § 
43(a) or, e.g., the right of publicity. 
It is to be hoped that the Court will continue the work that it has 
begun. The public domain's borders, having been drawn by the federal 
copyright and patent laws, must not be permitted to be truncated by other 
bodies of law, so that one dare not make free use of public domain works. 
Such intrusion on the balance Congress has established between the public 
domain and the copyright and patent-protected domain ought not be 
tolerated. This fact remains, no matter whether the attempted intrusion is by 
federal trademark law or by state law such as that regarding 




385-89,589 A.2d 1291 (1991) (preemption of conversion and unjust enrichment claims 
re: reproduction of computer software programs). 
See Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 528 F.Supp. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding cause of 
action under quasi-contract) (in this author's opinion, a cause of action under a contract 
implied-in-fact could have been properly found, instead). 
See supra note 26. 
